TREASURE, TURF AND TURMOIL COURSE

PRE-COURSE READING

INTRODUCTION

There are a variety of ways that conflict, natural resources and land tenure and property rights issues intersect. Many large-scale conflicts are linked to grievances over access to land, forests, minerals as well as other natural resources. During conflict access to resources changes and the displacement of the population can lead to overlapping claims and disputes over land and property. Starting with this document and continuing into the face-to-face course we will further explore the intersection of these issues and USAID programming.



This document covers core concepts in each of the three main topic areas including environmental and natural resources management and biodiversity (treasure), land tenure and property rights (turf) and conflict (turmoil) including:

Conflict

1. The Conflict Equation
2. "Conflict Sensitive" vs. "Direct Conflict" vs. "Traditional Development" Programming

ENRM/Biodiversity (Natural Resources)

1. What Works: Lessons Learned
2. Environmental Trends and Drivers
3. Systems Thinking
4. Integrated Approaches to Programming

Land Tenure and Property Rights

1. Western and Customary Land Tenure Concepts
2. Systems of Recording Rights
3. Legal Pluralism
4. Land and Resource Tenure Security

Prior to the face-to-face course we ask that you take the time to read and reflect on this document as it will serve as a basis for our course presentations, discussions and activities.

CONFLICT

1. The Conflict Equation – A Tool for Better Understanding Conflict Dynamics

Conflict is a complex phenomena and it is difficult to understand it without systematic analysis. Let's begin that analysis with a simple metaphor. The metaphor of starting a fire is a good fit for explaining the additive components of violent conflict. Ask yourself, "What is needed to create fire"? In most cases, wood, fuel and matches serve the purpose. To add a layer of further nuance, we'll borrow common language from the criminal justice system to reorient the metaphor and describe the key elements of conflict as motives, means and opportunities.

Motives, Means and Opportunities

Table 1 below captures the basic definition of motives, means and opportunities as they relate to conflict as well as some examples[1]:

Table 1: Motives, Means and Opportunities

Motives *Social patterns that threaten identity and provide the source for grievance.*	**Means** *Resources to mobilize and sustain violent conflict.*	**Opportunities** *A triggering event/moments in time that crystallize grievances and create a short-term window of vulnerability.*
Some examples of motives include: • Elitism • Exclusion • Chronic capacity deficits (systemic stagnation, strategic resources, ungoverned space) • Transitional moment; unmet expectations • Corruption/Rent-Seeking	Some examples of means include: • Leadership • Organizational capacities (technical skill, pools of recruits, information sharing) • Financing • Unrestricted operating space	Some examples of opportunities include: • Elections • Passage of legislation • Ruling in a court case • Assassinations/ targeted political violence • Holidays

It is critical to remember that like with the fire, all three elements are needed to create violent conflict. One or two existing alone will not result in violent conflict.

[1] For more information about the examples referenced in Table I, see Annex I: Examples of Motives, Means and Opportunities at the end of this document.

Additional Factors



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There are two additional key aspects to take into consideration when conducting a conflict analysis: **the context** and **mitigating factors**.

The Context

First you need to take into consideration the context in which a conflict occurs. Using the fire metaphor, think of oxygen as the context. It surrounds the whole equation and impacts everything in it – motives, means and opportunities.

There are two components to the context – structural conditions and governance issues. Research has shown that these characteristics can make a country more vulnerable to conflict.

- ***Structural conditions*** are conditions we treat as givens - they are difficult for humans to alter within our planning horizon. It is important to note that structural conditions alone do not cause conflict.
    - Examples include: poverty or low quality of life, recent history of conflict, low level of economic growth or recession, heterogeneity (with 2-3 equally sized groups you have higher competition) and youth bulge of 15-29 year olds.
- ***Governance*** refers to the ways the rules are made and enforced that affect peoples' day-to-day lives – both formally and informally. Governance mediates the effects of structural conditions on peoples' lives.

Mitigating Factors

What if you have all the elements to the equation and yet a situation does not end in violence? All situations have both stabilizing and destabilizing factors at play; though often not in balance. So, as you seek to understand the drivers of conflict it is equally important to recognize mitigating factors and peacekeeping functions that can maintain some degree of law and order, or keep fighting groups apart.

These factors can work to keep the brakes on conflict. When we analyze conflict we often focus so heavily on what is negative that the positives (or stabilizing factors) are under-supported. Evidence suggests that supporting the existing factors which mitigate conflict is often highly effective and also more sustainable than other types of interventions.

Examples of possible mitigating factors that can work on each aspect of the equation:

- ***Context:*** Membership in regional organizations; Effective, impartial judiciary. Methods of inter-group negotiation; history of reconciliation.
- ***Motives:*** Tradition of intermarriage leads to identities gradually being subsumed into a larger identity.
- ***Means:*** Presence of UN peacekeeping forces.
- ***Opportunities:*** Reliable, impartial media; an important legal decision publicly perceived as effective and legitimate.

2. "Conflict Sensitive" vs. "Direct Conflict" vs. "Traditional Development" Programming

Programming in a conflict-affected setting does not always look the same nor does doing traditional development work or humanitarian programming in these areas always seek to address the underlying drivers of conflict. Conducting an appropriate analysis of the current context and being explicit about program objectives in that setting will lead to more effective programming. Ask yourself, what issues must be taken into account when programming in a conflict environment? Use Figure 4 below as a quick reference guide and for more information see Annex II: Conflict Programming.



Figure 4: Traditional Development vs. Conflict Sensitive vs. Direct Conflict Programming

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ENRM) /BIODIVERSITY

1. What Works: Lessons Learned

Periodically, USAID examines its development activities to distill what has worked well and why. Through research, stocktaking exercises, and reviews, the following key lessons have been extracted as best practices in designing, implementing, and assessing development activities. From process, six key lessons learned have been identified:



Lesson 1: Take a Cross-sectoral Systems Approach and
Lesson 2: Consider Environmental, Economic, Governance and Social Dimensions

Analysis of approximately 20 years of Africa Bureau Natural Resources Management projects found that when ENRM projects took a *more holistic* approach to rural poverty alleviation and *integrated* these dimensions, they had greater success. This is because a systems approach takes a ***holistic*** view of the world and allows for ***interactions*** between sectors to be discovered. Research tells us that multidisciplinary approaches allow for the complexity and uncertainty within systems (Rolling and Jiggins, 1998).

A series of research papers indicates that a holistic, integrated approach that considers the ***environmental, economic, governance, and social dimensions*** of a system also increases the ***sustainability*** of development's impact.

Lesson 2: Foster Early Participation for Stakeholders at all Levels and
Lesson 3: Empower Local Capacity

Several case studies clearly illustrated the success that can be achieved when stakeholders are given authority and involved at all levels, including decision-making processes, rather than being asked to jump on a bandwagon designed by USAID or its contractors that is already well on its way down the road. For example, in a project in Ecuador, early involvement of stakeholders in designing project implementation led to more than 140 partners actively contributing to project activities and results.

Lesson 4: Support Social Networking and
Lesson 5: Facilitate Collaborative Action

An Environment Office program called GreenCOM analyzed social change and communication models, frameworks, and processes. It found that if you ***increase the number of stakeholders*** related to the issue, and ***increase the collaborative sustainable action and communication*** among those stakeholders, you can significantly scale up impact and achieve positive and lasting change.

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Lesson 6: Start at Scale

Finally, the lessons USAID learned pointed to the problem of pilot projects never reaching the scale necessary to achieve real change. While pilots are important learning test grounds, analysis had repeatedly proved that to reach scale, it is necessary to ***start*** at the scale you want to achieve. Work with the forest, not the tree. In an example from Jordan, to reform vocational training, projects need to work with the Ministry and the system, not one school. Similarly, if you need to improve water quality, you often have to work within the whole watershed.

2. Environmental Trends and Drivers

There are many environmental trends currently happening across the planet. From region to region, trends may vary significantly, however there are a handful of trends impacting the whole planet. These include land use change, habitat fragmentation and degradation, loss of forest cover, increasing energy use, biodiversity loss, marine resource depletion, freshwater scarcity and/or climate change. These trends are caused by drivers that can be direct or indirect.

Table 2: Direct and Indirect Drivers

Direct Driver **…has been proven to empirically proven to influence an ecosystem.**	**Indirect Driver…** **operate more diffusively by altering one or more drivers.**
Examples of direct drivers: changes in land use, introduction or removal of species, pollution, and/or climate change	**Examples of indirect drivers:** demographic changes, population changes, economic growth/shrinkage, sociopolitical factors, culture factors, and technological changes

Climate Change

As you may have notice Climate Change is listed as both a trend and driver. Indeed climate change is not only a major environmental trend but a direct driver of other environmental trends at the same time. The main driver of climate change is greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) from burning of fossil fuels and forest loss (e.g. carbon dioxide)

Climate change itself can results in impacts on all regions and sectors, for example:

- *Agriculture* (e.g. change in seasonal rainfall patterns, temperature changes)
- *Climatic variability* (e.g. increased frequency and severity of droughts, flooding and storms)
- *Changing distribution of disease* (e.g. malaria) and disease vectors (e.g. mosquitoes)

If you are interested in learning more about the specific regional impacts of climate change, see Annex III: Regional Climate Change.

3. Systems Thinking

A system is **a set of interrelated elements that change over time.** Some common examples of systems are an industry value chain, a family, or a university.

Some of us have been involved with environment for a long time and are familiar with systems approaches—ecosystems, watersheds, life cycles, and so on. And we know it's important to *consider the whole system* rather than just a piece of it.

A systems approach matters because it …

- Presents the ***big picture—***the forest *and* the trees!
- Helps us manage for the ***long term***, optimizing benefits over generations, not years.
- Identifies multiple ***entry points*** for effective interventions.
- Identifies ***tradeoffs and choices*** so costs can be shared equitably.
- Identifies ***stakeholders/partners*** and a platform for joint action.
- Looks at the ***dynamics and patterns*** as well as the components and elements

So how do you apply systems thinking to development?

There are two critical steps:

1. **Mapping the Context:** Understanding the system and trying to describe it holistically, often by organizing the information into categories (e.g. issues, assets, stakeholders, or dimensions of sustainability including environmental, economic, governance and social issues.)
2. **Identifying Leverage Points:** Identifying, in your context the place where a small shift in one thing can produce big changes in everything.

Example: Systems Thinking in Kenya

A development example of leverage comes from Kenya, where ICRAF (the World Agroforestry Centre) could have continued using three extension agents to reach out to farmers—a process that took several years to get about 40,000 farmers to adopt a specific technology. But in less than a year, by using a key leverage point and getting information to milk processors, ICRAF was able to reach and convince 100,000-plus farmers to adopt the dairy fodder shrub technology.

4. Integrated Approaches to Programming

An integrated approach is a way to grasp **the range of factors** affecting a result we want to achieve. It is a way to organize complex information so that we can identify:

- Patterns (spatial and social);
- Connections and linkages between factors;
- Flows and trends; and
- Pathways to impact.

Equally important, these approaches can help us find ways of working together with a range of stakeholders to achieve better results. Integration is not about doing everything or connecting everything together for the sake of it; rather, it is a way to be strategic. Use of integrated approaches helps us identify and keep a focus on drivers of problems, even if we can't directly address them. Integrated approaches help us identify objectives and pathways from specific actions to longer-term results. Finally, these approaches can show relationships between factors that shape ENRM outcomes that you need to understand to be effective.

There are four different approaches in the ENRM sector that we typically look at to help us see relationships between factors or sectors. Review Table 3 below to learn about each approach, key features, strengths, challenges and some examples.

Table 3: Integrated Approaches

Category	Key Feature(s)	Strength(s)	Challenges(s)	Examples
Spatial approaches help planners visualize and map interactions of natural and social features at different scales.	Increases scale of conservation action.	Captures major ecological features and wide-ranging fauna.	Requires significant data collection and planning across multiple units.	Integrated Water Resources Management
Conceptual approaches use mental maps or frameworks and can be roughly divided into two types: goal-oriented and system oriented.	Improves management by transferring rights and responsibilities to users.	Characterized by explicit links between conservation, good governance, and improved livelihoods.	Addressing rights/authorities and resource tenure is complicated.	Results Frameworks Nature, Wealth and Power
Economic and market approaches can help put a value on natural resource, species, or ecosystem services and create or strengthen markets for commodities and services that sustain that resources.	Values aspects of natural systems.	Links people dependent on specific resources and services.	Requires better markets and controls; sustaining the networks.	Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) Market/Value Chain
Stakeholder- and actor-based approaches bring key people and groups together for planning, advocacy, and collective action.	Uses networks as a tool to scale up; uses existing investments.	Reaches actors at a large scale; highlights collective dependence on resources or ecosystems.	Requires large-scale commitment by numerous actors at local and national levels.	SCALE Landcare

LAND TENURE AND PROPERTY RIGHTS

Resource governance, tenure, and property rights—the complex institutions and rules determining the ownership and allocation of land and natural resources— can be a source of conflict if they are unjust, unclear, or break down. However, if the governance of land and natural resources is addressed in a transparent, participatory and effective way, this can greatly reduce social and political grievances, reducing the risk of violent conflict. Property rights have obvious legal dimensions and economic implications, but also have social, cultural and political dimensions.

Figure 6: Dimensions of Property Rights

Land and resources tenure is the relationship among people as individuals or groups, with respect to land. Rules of tenure may be customary or determined by the state, and define how property rights in land are to be allocated within societies. Land tenure systems determine who can use what resources for how long, and under what conditions. Land tenure often has implications for rights to natural resources. Rights to land (and natural resources) can include the rights to possess; to use; to exclude others from using or to allow others to use; to sell; to give away; to dispose of by will; to recover from theft; and to receive compensation for damage. While some elements of this "bundle of rights" will be held by a single person or organization, others may be held by different land users. For example, a land owner may have the right to possess and sell the land, but another person (perhaps a relative) may have the right to use part of the land to grow crops, according to local custom.

1. Western and Customary Land Tenure Concepts

In most Western countries state-run land tenure systems, ownership (by the state, a group or an individual) is the basic building block of tenure. Ownership can be sold or given away. Other than the demands to the state, for example, payment of property taxes, ownership is not conditional upon many obligations. Other rights include:

- Lease
- Mortgage
- Usufruct

For example, property owners in Great Britain are able to sell, rent, mortgage and bequeath land in accordance with relatively clear laws/regulations and they have recourse to a functioning judicial system in the case of damage, dispute or fraud.

Customary tenure systems are bodies of norms governing land and resource use, generated and enforced by a sub-state polity; these norms may or may not be recognized by the national state. Custom is generally highly resilient and in the majority of the countries in which USAID works customary tenure is the predominant means by which people hold and transact land. Attempts to ignore or abolish custom can often be a cause of conflict.

Table 4: Myths and Truths about Customary Tenure

Myths about Customary Tenure	Truths about Customary Tenure
Unchanging	Complex and evolving
Communal	Private as well as communal
Informal	Institutions exist which enforce customary tenure

World Bank and FAO studies show that over 90% of land in developing countries is governed under customary tenure. Customary land tenure systems may have pluses (legitimacy, affordability, cultural embeddedness) and negatives (it may be undemocratic, or biased against women's land rights). Customary systems and state tenure systems often influence each other and overlap and interact in complex ways.

In many countries, it is common practice for the State to grant access or transfers ownership of land within the State's domain. Often, that land is also customarily held by indigenous or tribal groups that possess long standing ties to that particular geographic area. Conflict arises as these groups view the arrival of new inhabitants, or users, as illegitimate incursions onto their proprietary land.

2. Systems of Recording Rights

There are many different systems of recording rights to land and resources. **Land registration** is the official recording of legally recognized interests in land and is usually part of a cadastral system.

When introducing new systems of land registration or land titling it is common to consider whether the most appropriate approach is systematic or sporadic registration.

- **Sporadic registration** of land is the process of registering land on a case-by-case basis usually as the result of a specific trigger such as the sale of the property.
- **Systematic registration** is the systematic approach to adjudicating, surveying and registering parcels on an area by area basis.

Example: Land Registration in Rwanda

In Rwanda, USAID financed pilot land formalization activities. Lessons from those pilots were then incorporated into a Government of Rwanda national systematic land registration project which aims to formalize rights and reduce conflict over land.

Systematic registration of land in areas under customary, religious or informal tenure can lead to dispossession and landlessness, and can be a significant cause of conflict if secondary and tertiary rights to land and resources are ignored. However, systematic registration can be designed in ways that minimize these risks and is cheaper (per unit of land) and more efficient to implement than a long-term commitment to sporadic registration.

Groups or communities might also have land registered in their name. Group forms of tenure usually have some restriction on the ability to subdivide and alienate land registered this way. Resources such as forests may be owned by the state, but co-managed by local communities, who may have their rights to access and use the forest registered under the law. USAID/Ecuador has assisted indigenous groups in the Amazon to secure rights to customarily held territories located in protected areas through co-management agreements.

3. Legal Pluralism

In many countries, customary laws, religious laws, or other systems compete with statutory laws for legitimacy. The nature and interpretation of customary and religious laws tends to vary widely within single nations, and customary law interacts in complex ways with statutory property rights systems. A single parcel of land may be claimed by several different people under different systems.

Where legal pluralism - situations where different tenure systems overlap - exists, disputants will pursue their claims through several dispute-resolution systems (e.g. state, religious, customary) simultaneously in order to achieve the best possible outcome, or 'forum shopping'. Forum shopping leads to high levels of uncertainty and inefficiency, as decisions become particularly difficult to enforce when claims can be considered under other tenure systems. Nevertheless, some observers argue that a situation of legal pluralism is likely to reduce the risk of land disputes becoming violent, as disputants feel that there are several possibilities for redress and less chance of a definitive win-lose outcome.

4. Land and Resource Tenure Security

Land and resource tenure security is the expectation that rights are secure and cannot be overturned. Tenure security is related to the extent to which rights are clearly defined, and has multiple dimensions, including:

- the breadth of rights (what activities are possible and which are not),
- the duration of rights, and
- the assurance of rights (the reliability of enforcement mechanisms).

Without these elements, tenure is highly insecure, and may easily be challenged.

Tenure security is subjective and can be affected by changes in the socio-political and economic context. The state may seek to increase land and resource tenure security through land law reform, building capacity within legal and cadastral institutions, or land registration. Alternatively the state may be a source of tenure insecurity, if it condones or facilitates land-grabbing by elites, while at the same time ignoring or undermining customary claims to land.

NOTES AND REFLECTIONS

Reflect on the reading you have just completed:

What are the key insights you are taking away?

What questions do you have for the face-to-face course?

OPTIONAL ANNEXES

If you are interested in learning more, please read the following annexes:

- Annex I: Examples of Conflict Motives, Means and Opportunities
- Annex II: Conflict Programming
- Annex III: Regional Climate Change

ANNEX I: EXAMPLES OF CONFLICT MOTIVES, MEANS AND OPPORTUNITIES

Below are examples of different types of motives, means and opportunities that play a key role in the conflict equation.

MOTIVES

Social patterns that threaten identity and provide the source for grievances.

Elitism – Horizontal divide. Elites trying to hold on to power. This is a vertical contest between haves and have nots.

Some examples of elitism include:

- Feudal system
- Class conflicts
- French Revolution
- Caste systems in Nepal and India
- Royal families in Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Morocco.

Based on patterns of identity, castes or royalty/nobility are described as God's ordained pattern and so a justification for a difference in status. In all these cases your position in the social hierarchy determines your access to power and resources rather than other factors like education or ability.

Exclusion – Vertical divide. A rupture in society between groups.

Some examples of exclusion include the cases of Rwanda and South Africa. In post-Independence Rwanda, Hutu were running the bulk of the state. If you were a Tutsi in 1988 it would be hard for you to go to university, and nearly impossible to get a government job. In apartheid South Africa even a well educated black Africa had far less access to power and resources than even a poorly educated rural white African.

Chronic capacity deficits – This can look very different from country to country but the bottom line is that the country is no longer seen as able to provide the goods that are expected of the state. This failure to be able to provide the expected good could run through everything (i.e. no state provided health or education services, no rule of law, etc.)

It could also be that the state is not able to provide something specific that its population expects of it -- rule of law, education, elections, etc. In some cases people are more focused on the management of strategic resources such as oil in Nigeria, water in the Middle East, land in Kenya, or diamonds in Sierra Leone. The key questions in the case of strategic resources are: Who has access to it? Who benefits? and Where is it?

The legitimacy of the government in these cases hinges on its ability to manage resources. In other places, you have no representation of government at all in certain parts of the country. This neglect becomes an issue which allows conflict to erupt or to spillover.

Transitional Moment - Often in post-conflict period where people have high expectations and but there may not be any real change. People think, you promised us all of this change but nothing is happening. People get frustrated and the result can be a backlash of violence. Some examples of where transitional moments are happening include countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan. In addition, can also be the result of political transitions which do not produce expected benefits.

Corruption –Although corruption is a key in many conflicts we have not yet seen an example of a conflict that is driven solely to corruption. This seems to be more of a concurrent issue in most conflict situations.

MEANS
Resources to mobilize and sustain violent conflict.

Leadership means include examples such as

- Entrepreneurship (e.g., Robert Taylor in Liberia);
- Authority (e.g., King in Thailand);
- Ideology (e.g., Lenin, Stalin, and or Hitler); and/or
- Religious doctrine (e.g., Islamic Revolution Leader and Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei).

Organizational Capacities include technical skills (e.g. military, informational etc.); pool of recruits (e.g. disaffected youth); and/or informational capabilities (e.g., text messages, radio, and internet)

Financing pertains to elements such as:

- Access to funding flows (for example, in Liberia sales of weapons funded conflict and in Somalia in the 90s food aid added to the conflict economy);
- Diasporas (e.g., funding from the United States to the Irish Revolution Army (IRA) and from European Sources to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) funding); and
- Ability to buy weapons and equipment, ability to provide for or pay recruits; ability to buy military services (training or mercenaries).

Unrestricted Operating Space is the ability to operate without fear of reprisal. Often we think of this as a safe haven that is either across a border or internal to the country. Increasingly of late we have seen that groups can operate under the radar in urban areas like slums that are under-governed or not governed at all.

OPPORTUNITIES

A triggering event/moments in time that crystallize grievances and create a short-term window of vulnerability.

Holidays especially if it is a holiday that mobilizes people along a certain identity or holidays can be celebrated in a way that is antagonistic to those not of that identity group.

For example, for more than 200 years, the marching season has been a source of conflict between Northern Ireland's Protestant and Catholic communities. Members of the Protestant Orange Order, who stage the vast majority of the parades, insist it is part of their cultural heritage to march in commemoration of key historical events. Catholics argue that they should not have to endure the "triumphalist" parades, mostly celebrating Protestant victories over Catholics, through their neighborhoods.

Triggers are the hardest to see coming because they are so closely entwined with local cultures and often an outsider cannot call what will be a triggering event and what will not. Although it is hard to make steadfast rules on triggers because they do vary so much from context to context, a couple of things you can watch out for:

- *Shifts in the way that people talk about others in their society/community.*
- *Cascading events where several triggering events in a short time span may be the rise of a conflict crescendo.*

Examples of triggering events include:

- The shooting down of the plane carrying the Rwandan president triggering the 1994 genocide;
- The 2007 Kenyan elections in 2007/8;
- The raising prices of bread in Egypt 1970s; and
- The Rodney King beating that triggered riots in Los Angeles.

ANNEX II: CONFLICT PROGRAMMING

See the article "A Distinction with a Difference: Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding" by Peter Woodrow and Diane Chigas.

A Distinction with a Difference: Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding

Peter Woodrow and Diana Chigas
Reflecting on Peace Practice Project, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects

Introduction

Are peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity the same thing? Different but related? Completely separate? Increasingly, practitioners and policy makers give different—and often opposing—answers to these simple questions. Part of the difficulty arises from the "migration" of the terms, as both have shifted their meanings over time, each coming to embrace more and more conceptual territory. Also, the various actors involved have shifted their roles. Development and humanitarian agencies have expanded from their traditional roles and increasingly attempt to address conflicts more directly. At the same time, peace practitioners recognize the need to address structural causes of conflict—which often requires development modes of programming. In the process, many people have become increasingly uncertain about what these two concepts mean and whether the distinction is even important. Why should we care about this confusion? is it causing harm?

Experience shows that conflating the two concepts or treating them as entirely distinct and unrelated, results in poorly conceived programming and reduces effectiveness. This article examines the damage done by this conceptual confusion, and proposes some ways to distinguish peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity that, evidence suggests, may lead to more effective peacebuilding and conflict sensitive practice. First, let us look at specific problems within the notions of conflict sensitivity and of peacebuilding.

Evolving Misunderstandings of and Gaps in Conflict Sensitivity

Conflict sensitivity refers to the ability of an organization to: a) understand the context in which it is operating, b) understand the interaction between the intervention and that context, and c) act upon that understanding, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts on the conflict.[1] Over the years, many staff members of donor agencies, UN entities and larger development NGOs have come to use tools and frameworks that were developed to make development or humanitarian assistance programs conflict sensitive as a basis for peacebuilding policies and planning. They have also come to operate under the (false) assumption that conflict sensitive programming is the same as peacebuilding. At the *headquarters level*, policies and programming concepts that address conflict sensitivity have come to include what many consider

[1] *See* International Alert *et al.*, 2004. *Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding: a resource Pack.* London: International Alert (available for download at www.conflictsensitivity.org).

to be peacebuilding approaches. Conflict analysis frameworks have proliferated, as many agencies have developed their own frameworks for conflict analysis—from UNDP to the World Bank to bilateral donors, such as USAID, DFID, SIDA or GTZ, as well as large NGOs. DFID's Guidance Notes on conducting conflict assessments describes the aim of understanding the impact of development actors on conflict and peace as identifying "conflict related risks that need to be mitigated and opportunities for programmes/policies to better contribute to peacebuilding."[2] Conflict-sensitive practice has come to mean not only adjusting existing development, humanitarian, human rights and other activities to avoid or minimize negative impacts and promote positive impacts on the conflict context, but also the design of initiatives to address conflict causes. It is a small conceptual leap then to assume that if one is engaging in good "conflict sensitive programming," one will accomplish peacebuilding goals.

The expansion of the concept of conflict sensitivity has led to gaps in conflict-sensitive practice. First, the focus on developing conflict analysis frameworks and methods has led to a relative neglect of practical guidance for conflict-sensitive program implementation. While donor agencies (and others) have adopted policies that enshrine the principle of conflict sensitivity, they fail to follow through to provide practical guidance regarding how to implement such policies—both in terms of priorities and the broadest articulation of program approaches and with regard to field operations. Donor policies seldom provide any consequences for neglecting to perform the necessary assessments to ensure conflict sensitive programming or penalize activities that actually caused harm. CDA's Do No Harm project has not yet encountered any donor that has taken action (withdrawn funding, issued a rebuke, warned of impending harm…) with respect to implementing agencies that have even flagrantly violated Do No Harm principles.

Thus, at the *field level* of program implementation, development, humanitarian and peace agencies regularly neglect the practicalities of performing the necessary analyses and program adjustments to ensure true conflict sensitivity. As the Do No Harm project has been finding, when agencies do perform an analysis, they often use the analysis only for initial program design, but seldom monitor the subsequent impacts to identify unintended consequences or adjust programming to address these consequences. For example, an international agency in Nepal did a brilliant initial Do No Harm analysis, nicely bound and placed prominently on the shelf in the office in Katmandu. Thereafter, there was no systematic analysis of the positive or negative program effects on conflict, although local staff in the field did make minor day-to-day adjustments as they could, but did not communicate their observations to the office in the capital.

In addition, little attention has been paid to how conflict sensitivity works at the *policy level*. Most of the learning about conflict sensitive practice has been at the operational level in the field, with respect to program design decisions about what assistance to provide, to whom, why, by whom, using what methods, etc. A challenge remains as to what conflict sensitivity might mean at the policy level. For example, how do we assess whether donor decisions to start or stop whole areas of programming have had positive or negative effects on conflict? Similarly, as some donors have shifted to a greater reliance on budgetary support, ways of analyzing the implications and actual impacts of such approaches on conflict and ensuring that such assistance is conflict-sensitive remain to be developed.

[2] DFID, 2002. *Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes*. London: DFID, p. 22. Available at http://94.126.106.9/Documents/publications/conflictassessmentguidance.pdf.

Evolving Misunderstandings of and Gaps in Peacebuilding

The notion of peacebuilding has undergone expansion similar to conflict sensitivity, with similar consequences. Originally, the peacebuilding term came into popular usage as a result of a report by Boutros Boutros Ghali, then Secretary General of the United Nations. He delineated several types of work for peace: *preventive diplomacy* designed to prevent the outbreak of war, *peacemaking* aimed at ceasing war making and bringing warring parties to the negotiation table to forge a peace settlement; *peacekeeping* dedicated to providing security through the presence of peacekeeping forces; and *peacebuilding* focused on consolidating peace in the aftermath of war and violence and preventing a further round of bloodshed. Peacebuilding, referred to "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."[3]

Over time, the peacebuilding concept has broadened. In 2001, the UN Security Council noted that peacebuilding efforts are "aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompass a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms."[4] Peacebuilding now often refers to the entire field of peace practice, without respect to a stage of conflict or a particular set of activities or goals.[5] The recent OECD DAC Guidelines on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities include socio-economic development, good governance, justice and security sector reform, reconciliation, and truth and justice activities in the domain of peacebuilding.[6]

Not infrequently, practitioners now consider their work during an active war to be peacebuilding. For instance, an unofficial process of dialogue aimed at supporting an official peace negotiation process or a program of peace education intended to transform social norms regarding tolerance might each call themselves peacebuilding, whether carried out during periods of violence or in its aftermath. We also see peacebuilding activities touted as conflict prevention, in periods before violence escalates. Many organizations that work on conflict transformation, conflict resolution, reconciliation (and a string of other titles) consider themselves as part of the broader "field" of peacebuilding, and use the term in their names, such as the Alliance for Peacebuilding.

While the expansion of the meaning of "peacebuilding" reflects the realities of building and consolidating peace, it also has created confusion and gaps in practice. The lack of definitional

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[3] Boutros Boutros Ghali. 1992 "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping." UN Doc. A/47/277—S/24111 (17 June 1992).

[4] Presidential Statement, UN Security Council. United Nations Doc. S/PRST/2001/5, 20 February 2001.

[5] In a possible exception, the UN still differentiates somewhat, though inconsistently. For instance, the UN Peacebuilding Commission restricts its work to the so-called "post-conflict" period (which is really post-violence, as the actual conflict usually continues).

[6] OECD-DAC. 2007. *Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities*. Paris: OECD DAC, p. 18. Available at www.oecd.org . *See also* Smith, D. 2004. *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together* (Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding). Oslo: PRIO, pp. 22, 27-28 (Smith groups peacebuilding activities under four headings: security, establishing the socioeconomic foundations for peace, establishing the political framework, and generating reconciliation).

specificity and intellectual rigor about peacebuilding has allowed an attitude of "anything goes." Thus, anything that anyone chooses to call peacebuilding is embraced as part of the field. Many policies, programmes and even conceptual frameworks for peacebuilding, for example, do not make conceptual distinctions between state building, peacebuilding, governance and development. While clearly all of these phenomena are related, and activities in all domains—socio-economic development, governance, justice and security, and reconciliation and culture—are needed, they are not all the same. State weakness is not the same as conflict, nor its only cause, even when it may be a contributor to its escalation. Similarly, conflict can be seen as a result, a symptom or a cause of fragility.[7]

Many peacebuilding programs are poorly conceived, demonstrating unclear goals, fuzzy theories of change about how their activities will in fact contribute to peace, vague indicators, imprecise accountability mechanisms and faulty evaluation measures—all stemming, *in part*, from the lack of clarity about the boundaries and aims of peacebuilding. (There are, of course, many other reasons not covered here.)

Here again, the conflation of peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity undermines the effectiveness of peacebuilding practice, as agencies in the field think that they are accomplishing peacebuilding as long as they are being conflict sensitive. On the one hand, conflict sensitivity has provided agencies a way to assuage their discomfort with the fact that peacebuilding is about change—a fundamentally political process. It is easier and less threatening to talk about "conflict-sensitive programming" in circumstances where a host government will resist any reference to peace, especially where it is a party to the conflict. The use of conflict sensitivity in place of peacebuilding is, in some cases, a tactic for avoiding awkward political interactions with host governments and other parties in conflict zones. A consequence, however, is often that the dynamics that drive the conflict are not addressed.

The Consequences: Common Myths and Misconceptions

Having discussed some of the issues with both terms, we now turn to the negative consequences of the confusion of peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity for the effectiveness of both.

Conflict-sensitive humanitarian assistance will help bring peace. Some organizations try to adhere faithfully to principles of conflict sensitivity (or Do No Harm) as they conduct their relief efforts. Some of them have assumed that doing so will also contribute to peace. It should be clear that such efforts are not sufficient for peacebuilding. A few examples illustrate the point.

Consider the case of an international agency that provides assistance to returning populations affected by conflict, both housing reconstruction and livelihood support. The assistance is provided initially mainly to returnees of one ethnic group who had been displaced by ethnic cleansing by the other, and only later to returnees from the other group who were displaced by revenge-motivated violence that followed. The agency adopts a practice of providing "balancing grants" to return communities, in recognition of the potential harmful conflict effects of targeting

[7] Fabra Mata, Javier & Ziaja, S. 2009. *Users' Guide on Sources Measuring Fragility and Conflict.* Oslo and Bonn: UNDP and German Development Institute, p. 7.

the neediest. The agency also seeks to support bridge-building in these communities by sponsoring sports inter-ethnic sports events, community development projects, and cultural activities (drama, music).

All of this might constitute good conflict-sensitive humanitarian practice (one would need to do a thorough analysis of the impacts on dividers and connectors in the communities to assess this accurately), but the initiatives do not constitute a robust peacebuilding strategy, as they do not address the driving factors of conflict. For instance, the program does not address the continuing feelings of injustice and grievances expressed by members of both communities as a key obstacle to peace. Indeed, in some cases, resentment by one group regarding the amount of aid directed to returnees from the other, who had oppressed them, increases and worsens tensions between the two. Moreover, while the bridge-building activities do help bring people together, few of the resulting relationships extend beyond the level of personal or business contact. The activities provide a valuable support to existing connectors (personal relationships and friendships that had existed before the war), but without further effort and attention to internal dynamics that affect inter-ethnic relations, the activities will not "add up" to improve relations at an inter-group level.

In another example, an international agency provided assistance to displaced people in an area plagued by chronic battles among rival militias, with weak government presence and ineffective security operations. Following conflict sensitive principles, the agency ensured that local populations, as well as the displaced people, received assistance. They also negotiated with the dominant warlords to prevent expropriation of aid goods by militias—as families receiving assistance were vulnerable to attacks. As in the previous example, this program may well have been conflict sensitive, but while the negotiations with warlords may have increased local security in the short term, there is no evidence that these measures would address the key drivers of conflict in the area. Depending on the causes of conflict, it might be possible to add program components that constitute peacebuilding goals. For instance, careful analysis might reveal that the warlords represent disaffected populations that feel they have been excluded from access to decision making and development programs over many years. A strategy could be developed to address those inequalities, which could add important peacebuilding dimensions.

A caution: Relief and reconciliation assistance can make victims more vulnerable. Following conflict-sensitive principles in program design not only does not ensure positive peace effects; it does not ensure that a program will do no harm. For example, a local NGO was helping displaced people to return to their communities, in the wake of post-election violence in Kenya, during which many homes had been burned. They organized a process of dialogue between the displaced groups and their neighbors. They helped people to rebuild their homes, providing new roofing sheets and building materials and recruiting neighbors from other ethnic groups to help in rebuilding (part of the healing/reconciliation process). However, it soon became obvious that all of the rebuilt homes had shiny new roofs, essentially making them visible targets if violence were to flare up again! The new roofs also brought attention to the fact that the displaced people were receiving direct assistance, while their neighbors, many of them also poor, were not. Ongoing analysis of dividers and connectors and the program impacts on them is needed.

Peacebuilding equals conflict-sensitive development. Many practitioners believe that if they undertake development programs in a conflict sensitive manner, they will contribute to peace. This is possible but not inevitable. Whether conflict-sensitive development programming actually contributes to Peace Writ Large will depend on the nature of the conflict, the precise program design and the resulting actual impacts. Again, three examples illustrate the point.

Example 1: In the wake of war and violence, the national government makes job creation a top priority. In cooperation with the International Labor Organization (a UN agency) and the Ministry of Agriculture, an international NGO and several local partner agencies undertake an agricultural training program for ex-combatants. To ensure it is conflict-sensitive, the program plans to recruit ex-soldiers from all of the formerly warring factions and all of the competing ethnic groups and provide them with intensive training in farming skills, emphasizing high-value cash crops and cooperative group efforts in the production process.

Even if this program were sufficiently conflict sensitive (there might be issues regarding the availability of arable land for the trainees, and others which could exacerbate conflicts at the local level), it is not at all clear that such a program would actually contribute to peace. It might be possible to add peacebuilding objectives to the program—which would then turn it into a hybrid development and peacebuilding program. For instance, during the training in farming techniques, participants might also be given skills in communication and dialogue—and provided opportunities to address ongoing inter-ethnic tensions. Such an initiative might, over time, begin to reduce mutual distrust—at least among direct participants. Whether such positive effects on participants would extend to their communities or to larger social dynamics would remain a question. The program designers might have identified continuing command structures among ex-combatants as a threat to peace and assumed that the program would contribute to the breakdown of those command structures—that is, by engaging in productive agricultural activities the ex-combatants would be less closely tied to their former military leaders and fellow soldiers. Again, that is a possible outcome, but not guaranteed, and is not likely to occur automatically.

Example 2: In another program, an NGO implements a program to support communities to develop and implement sustainable income-generating and capacity-building activities at the community level. Undertaken in a post-war context, this project is framed as a community-level peacebuilding project. The program provides training in conflict management in the communities, and then provides a block grant for projects to support income-generation. The community, through its Community Development Council and broader community-wide meetings, establishes the priorities for allocation of the grants, with the condition that the process must include all groups in the community, that is, priorities cannot be decided by the leadership alone.

In this way, the NGO hopes to maximize the potential that the grants benefit the entire community, and to promote coexistence amongst the groups by bringing them together across conflict lines to make decisions jointly. It ensures that no group is left out, and that the program integrates system to ensure that the aid is not captured by any one faction. In terms of results, it provide some livelihoods assistance, and helps improve relationships among some community members. Some disputes, such as marital disputes and land disputes, are referred to those trained

in conflict management. However, the community dialogues and the resulting projects are a simple aggregation of individual preferences in the community, and do not analyze or address the causes of conflict or barriers to coexistence. While the project succeeds in strengthening connectors in the community, as well as mitigating potentially divisive issues such as land, without further work to address the drivers of conflict, it is not effective peacebuilding.

Example 3: An agency rebuilds destroyed homes and provides small income-generation grants to returning refugees and IDPs. As part of the program, the agency sponsors inter-ethnic dialogue between returnees and host community members and provides "balancing grants" to the host communities for priority community infrastructure or income-generation projects. Inter-ethnic community reconstruction committees are formed to guide reconstruction efforts and determine priorities. In addition, the agency sponsors a number of sports and cultural events in the community to bring together people from both groups, especially youth, for positive interaction.

This program is quite conflict-sensitive. The agency recognized that its returns program would benefit one ethnic group in the community and not the other, and created mechanisms for ensuring that all would benefit from assistance. They also tried to foster positive inter-ethnic interaction and cooperation, both at a social level and on issues of common concern (such as infrastructure). It is not clear, however, whether and to what extent the program would contribute to peace. While it avoided exacerbation of tensions that could result from the distribution of aid to refugees and IDPs, and did foster some positive inter-ethnic social interaction, it did not address the driving factors of conflict—which community members described as injustice and impunity related to oppression and violence by each group against the other, security and opposing visions of the future.

Another caution about the conflation of conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding is warranted here: there are times when promotion of connectors and reinforcement of bridges across conflict lines can reinforce the conflict status quo. A powerful—and counterintuitive—example occurred in Kosovo, where donors and NGOs supported cross-ethnic economic activities, to promote economic interdependence as well as contacts and cooperation across ethnic lines. Peacebuilding through economic cooperation tended to mirror existing, implicit "rules of the game" for inter-ethnic interaction amongst Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs, which permitted interaction for economic but not for social or political purposes. The programs therefore added little to the existing quality of interaction. And, the "rules of the inter-ethnic game" limited the depth and breadth of relationships that could be developed, ensuring that any inter-ethnic engagements that did occur would not challenge the polarization of Kosovo Serb—Kosovo-Albanian relations.

When Conflict Sensitive Practice Promotes Peace: In the experience of Do No Harm practitioners in the field, it is sometimes possible to use tools for conflict sensitivity (like Do No Harm) not only to mitigate dividers and support connectors, but also to promote positive impacts on peace. That is, in some situations, people have used conflict sensitivity tools to do peace work. Because this experience is not the norm, it is important to be clear about why and under what conditions this can occur.

First, using conflict sensitivity tools and frameworks to design and implement peacebuilding seems to occur primarily at a local level, by local actors. In part, this is because local people know their contexts well and can identify precisely, at any given time, which dividers are most likely to cause violence, and which connectors are most important. They are then able to figure out how to design development or humanitarian initiatives in such a way that they reduce dividers and reduce violence or reinforce connectors.

Moreover, as RPP has found, the very fact that local actors are taking their own initiatives to resist violence or address conflict constitutes a contribution to Peace Writ Large, as it reflects local ownership and initiative for peace. In this way, the use of Do No Harm conflict sensitivity frameworks can have greater impacts on Peace Writ Large than their use by international agencies or outsiders.

Second, experience also shows that, when conflict resolution requires efforts at a higher political level, a more thorough analysis of driving factors and a more robust strategy that addresses these factors are required. This evidence reinforces our basic caution that conflict-sensitivity models and tools are insufficient for peacebuilding at most levels.

Development will promote conflict prevention. Perhaps the most persistent myth among international aid workers is that development efforts of nearly all types will contribute to peace (and the prevention of violent conflict), particularly if they are implemented in a conflict-sensitive manner. Early and incomplete evidence shows that there is only a weak association between "normal" development programming and conflict prevention, at best.

For instance, many assume that any advance in reducing poverty will contribute to peace—but this is not supported by the experience in the field. Here again, a thorough conflict analysis might reveal that development dollars aimed at poverty reduction have been distributed in a distorted manner, causing deeper and deeper resentment among excluded groups. If poverty reduction strategies actually started to achieve greater equity, they might contribute to peace. But note that simply reducing poverty would not achieve peace; equity, fairness and inclusion are key factors that must be addressed.

Similarly, special types of programming developed for post-conflict situations—such as demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR)—also often assume that restructuring of the armed forces or changes in police operations will support peace. Of course, both DDR and SSR programs *can* contribute to peace—as physical security and perceptions of security are important dimensions of peace. But many SSR and DDR programs do not even ask themselves whether they have contributed to Peace Writ Large; they *assume* that they have. Their measures of success are often associated with the number of

soldiers demobilized or reintegrated, the effective functioning of command structures, the ability to respond to threats, or numbers of police trained in human rights. They do not ask—either at the program design stage or during evaluation—whether any of these accomplishments actually result in improved physical or psychological security. Again, issues of equity (who is hired, who is in command, who makes decisions) and treatment of the population may have a strong association with conflict issues, and undertaking SSR with a conflict-sensitive lens may improve the likelihood that the program can reduce vulnerability to violent conflict. Pushing beyond conflict sensitivity to a more thorough understanding of conflict dynamics will increase the potential contribution of SSR programming to true prevention of violent conflict.

Peacebuilding is conflict-sensitive by definition. Many peacebuilding practitioners assume that, because they are working for peace, they are, by definition, conflict sensitive. This is not so! Peacebuilders are just as capable of acting in ways that are *insensitive* to conflict as other field workers. For example, they can inadvertently hire people from one ethnic group—because all of the available English-speaking (or French-speaking…) candidates happen to be from the economic/socially favored group. SSR programs can improve the delivery of justice or the performance of the policy in general, but the aggregate statistics (numbers of convictions, recorded crimes, police, perceptions of effectiveness of the courts and police, etc.) may hide deep inter-group inequalities in policing and justice. Peacebuilding activities can also increase danger to participants in peace activities, and they can disempower local people and initiatives.[8]

Many peacebuilding programs assess the conflict-sensitivity of their programs only at the design stage or, more often, not at all. If conflict-sensitive programming is peacebuilding, and peacebuilding is by its nature designed to address the causes of conflict, then the program is *ipso facto* conflict sensitive and requires no further analysis—or so the theory goes. The bottom line: peacebuilding programs must pay attention to the intended and unintended consequences on conflict dynamics from their programs, just as other program types do.

Clarifying Peacebuilding and Conflict Sensitivity: Definitions and Dimensions of Difference

The chart below shows the differences between conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding along a series of dimensions: definition, main aim, applicability to whom and what kinds of programming, analysis requirements, and standards/measures.

The establishment of hard and fast boundaries between conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding will always be elusive—and unwise. The soft boundaries between the two reflect the complexities of working both *in* and *on* conflict, and the reality that peacebuilding in practice has come to incorporate development, humanitarian, justice and human rights modes of programming. However, conceptual clarity, even in the face of blurry boundaries, can strengthen both the effectiveness of peacebuilding practice and the ability of development, humanitarian and other programming to minimize negative and maximize positive impacts on conflict. We propose the definitions and distinctions in the chart above, and further clarified below, as a basis for more robust peacebuilding and conflict-sensitive practice.

[8] These and other inadvertent negative impacts of peacebuilding programs were discussed in Mary B. Anderson and Lara Olson, *Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners* (Cambridge: CDA, 2003).

COMPARISON OF CONFLICT SENSITIVITY AND PEACEBUILDING

Conflict Sensitivity	Peacebuilding
Definition:[9] Conflict sensitivity refers to the ability of an organization to: ▪ Understand the context in which it is operating, particularly intergroup relations; ▪ Understand the interactions between its interventions and the context/group relations; and ▪ Act upon the understanding of these interactions, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts.	**Definition:**[10] Peacebuilding refers to measures designed to consolidate peaceful relations and strengthen viable political, socio-economic, and cultural institutions capable of handling conflict, and to strengthen other mechanisms that will either create or support the necessary conditions for sustained peace.
Main aim: Work **IN** the context of conflict to minimize negative and maximize positive impacts of programming (on conflict, but also on other factors).	**Main aim:** Work **ON** conflict, seeking to reduce key drivers of violent conflict and to contribute to Peace Writ Large (the broader societal-level peace).
Applied to Whom/What Programming: All programmes, of all types, in all sectors, at all stages of conflict (latent, hot, post-war) must be conflict sensitive, including peacebuilding efforts themselves.	**Applied to Whom/What Programming:** Peacebuilding programmes are those that articulate goals or objectives aimed at securing peace. Such goals/objectives can be integrated into other programming modes (development, relief) and sectors—or peacebuilding can be a standalone effort.
Required Analysis: Requires an adequate understanding of the conflict (e.g., dividers and connectors analysis) to avoid worsening dividers or weakening connectors; to reduce dividers and support existing connectors.	**Required Analysis:** Requires a deeper understanding of the key drivers of conflict and dynamics among factors and key actors, in order to ensure program relevance.
Standard/Measure of Effectiveness: At a minimum, the program/project does not make the conflict worse—and usually also makes a positive contribution.	**Standard/Measure of Effectiveness:** Programme/project reduces the power of key driving factors of conflict, contributing to Peace Writ Large.

[9] Definition adapted slightly from International Alert, *et al.* 2003. *Conflict sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding: a resource pack.*

[10] Definition from International Alert, 2003, as quoted in the *resource pack* (see *op. cit.* in above footnote).

There are two significant implications of these distinctions. *First, conflict sensitivity is a fundamental principle of good and responsible practice that is applicable to ALL programs*. In this way, it is most useful in an adjectival form: "conflict sensitive," rather than as a noun, which implies that it is a type of programming in its own right. As an adjective, it can (and should) be applied to humanitarian assistance, development efforts, peacebuilding, peacekeeping operations, human rights advocacy, security sector reform, demobilization of combatants, work with women and youth, and so forth.

> *ALL programs in ALL contexts, regardless of sector, program type, conflict phase or constituency, should be conflict-sensitive. That is, they must take account of the potential for violent conflict, and adopt measures to minimize the negative effects and maximize the positive effects of program efforts.*

This continues to be the main insight from CDA's Do No Harm Project,[11] and the tools and frameworks from that project remain among the best and most widely-used approaches for ensuring that humanitarian and development programming is conflict sensitive.

Second, we can be clear about what peacebuilding is:

> *Peacebuilding is a type of programming with particular aims. It includes a wide range of programming modes with a common aim: they all aim explicitly to address the key drivers of conflict and, ultimately, change the conflict dynamics, with particular emphasis on reducing or preventing violence as a means of addressing political, social and economic problems and injustices.*

Some argue that peacebuilding has become its own academic field and programming sector. Others assert that it is a cross-cutting set of considerations that should intersect with all sectors and work with all constituencies. This is one source of confusion with conflict sensitivity, as it is also a cross-cutting lens. *Conflict-sensitive principles must be applied to various types of programming as noted above—they do not stand on their own. Peacebuilding programs can and do stand alone.*

Classic peacebuilding programs include dialogue efforts (at various levels and engaging a range of different types of stakeholders), negotiations, mediation, transitional justice, peace education, and training in conflict resolution skills. These program modes can be applied in a wide range of sectors—to address key conflict drivers. For example, one might engage in public dialogue to enhance a police reform effort or organize a negotiation process to develop a new constitution. Classic development, human rights, justice reform and other programs can also be critical for peacebuilding—if they are relevant and address key driving factors of conflict. Economic development programs or education reform can be equally important peacebuilding efforts, where, for example, horizontal inequalities or unequal access to education (and jobs and political power) are underlying causes of conflict. As peacebuilding programs, however, they must be designed and implemented quite differently than they would be if their aims were purely developmental. (In practice, however, they often are not.) They must also be assessed for their capacity to address those factors, not only for their development success.

[11] See CDA Collaborative Learning Projects and its Do No Harm Project at www.cdainc.com.

Conclusion

The distinction between conflict sensitive practice and peacebuilding matters, because the lack of clarity and prevailing confusion are now weakening many programs. People are uncertain about why their peace efforts are failing. All too often, one reason is that they are working on false assumptions about conflict sensitivity or peacebuilding or both. Mixing them up leads to flawed program design.

It is time to clarify these terms and articulate the practical consequences in the field—in order to strengthen both conflict sensitive programming and peace practice.

ANNEX III: REGIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE

Africa

Africa is one of the most vulnerable continents to climate change and climate variability. This situation is aggravated by the interaction of "multiple stresses," occurring at various levels, and low adaptive capacity.

- By 2020, between 75 million and 250 million Africans are projected to be exposed to increased water stress. In some countries, yields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by up to 50 percent.
- Projected sea-level rises will affect low-lying coastal areas with large populations. The cost of adaptation could reach at least 5 to 10 percent of gross domestic product in some countries.
- By 2080, the amount of arid and semi-arid land in Africa is projected to increase by 5 to 8 percent.

Asia

Because of its size, Asia is already showing tangible effects of climate change in many areas. The continent is likely to continue to experience significant impacts on its water resources, agriculture, marine and coastal ecosystems, forests and biodiversity, and human health. Rapid urbanization, industrialization, and economic development will increase pressures on the environment.

- By the 2050s, freshwater availability, particularly in large river basins, is projected to decline.
- Coastal areas will experience a greater risk of flooding.
- Endemic morbidity and mortality owing to diarrheal disease primarily associated with floods and droughts are expected to rise.

Latin America and the Caribbean

Climate change will harm precipitation, causing water stress and diminishing agricultural productivity. Coastal areas are likely to experience sea-level rises and extreme weather, while land-use changes and land degradation by human activities will continue to threaten biodiversity.

- By midcentury, increases in temperature and associated decreases in soil moisture are projected to lead to gradual replacement of tropical forest by savanna.
- There is a risk of significant biodiversity loss through species extinction.
- The productivity of livestock and some important crops is projected to decline.
- Changes in precipitation patterns and the disappearance of Andean glaciers are projected to significantly affect water availability.

Small Island Nations

Small islands, whether located in the tropics or higher latitudes, have characteristics that make them especially vulnerable to the effects of climate change, sea-level rises, and extreme weather.

- Deterioration of coastal conditions is expected to affect local resources and reduce the value of these destinations for tourism.
- Sea-level rises are expected to exacerbate flooding, storm surge, erosion, and other coastal hazards.
- Climate change is projected to reduce water resources.
- With higher temperatures, increased invasion by nonnative species is expected to occur, particularly on mid- and high-latitude islands.

To read more in-depth information on regional climate change impacts, adaptations, and vulnerabilities for each of the regions above, download the 2007 International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment report chapters listed below:

Africa
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter9.pdf

Asia
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter10.pdf

Latin America and the Caribbean
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter13.pdf

Small Island Nations
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter16.pdf